A while ago, I read an article by James O’Toole entitled “Archives and Historical Accountability: Toward a Moral Theology of Archives.” This article was published in the Fall 2004 issue of Archivaria. At the time of its publication (and still currently), O’Toole serves as a history professor at Boston College; he previously taught history at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. But he also has a library science degree and began his professional career with a number of archival jobs — at the New England Historic Genealogical Society, the Archives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and as Archivist of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston. Anyone who’s received their archival training in the last several decades is probably familiar with his book (whose second edition was co-authored by Richard J. Cox) Understanding Archives and Manuscripts.
The article is thought-provoking, so I knew I needed some time to mull it over. And it also prompted me to dig into one of its inspirations. But I think now is the right time to delve into the principle of accountability and take a closer look at archival moral theology.
O’Toole began by looking at Frank Burke’s 1980 talk about archival education where he presented the idea that the archival profession has plenty of “parish priests” who take care of the day-to-day work but needs more “theologians” who can focus more on the teaching and researching that is typically done by academic professionals. With that background in place, O’Toole provided an explanation of theology, whose task he defined simply as “[finding] the words to say what we want to say about some very big issues” (6). He borrowed from Scottish Anglican theologian John Macquarrie the division of theology into three branches:
- philosophical theology, which “sets forth the fundamental concepts and presumptions of the discipline” (6)
- symbolic theology, which delves into the symbols and metaphors used to give expression to our understandings of the divine
- applied theology, which looks at how faith is executed in people’s day-to-day lives
O’Toole argued that these divisions appropriately apply as well to archival work. The philosophical part of our work is our commitment to the importance of the archival imperative and our consideration of why we do this work:
“that the documentation of human affairs has enduring relevance by providing continuity, even self-continuity; that records constitute the collective memory of individuals and societies and that this memory is essential to those societies and the people in them; that records support and sustain other important societal values” (8).
He defined our “accepted dogmas” as the symbolic theology of archives, including provenance, original order, description, etc. And the applied theology of archives “encompasses all those things archivists do to realize their philosophical and symbolic insights, including acquisition, appraisal, arrangement, establishing fair and equitable use policies, physical preservation, programmatic stability and growth, and so on” (8).
O’Toole was careful to make a distinction between theology and ethics, which he described as the “specific behaviours that archivists should either cultivate or avoid” (9). While he acknowledged the importance of codes of ethics that many professions embrace, he also argued “they are unavoidably situational, designed to offer guidance in particular instances” (10). He instead attempted to provide a broader and more long-term vision of the responsibilities of archivists. Key to his understanding of the moral theology of archives is historical accountability:
“Do archivists bear any moral responsibility to a more open-ended future, a time when the practical impact of any particular cases will have diminished or disappeared altogether and the actions of those involved will matter only historically? Such accountability is vaguer, perhaps, since we cannot now foresee the exact circumstances that will call for it or the possibly competing cultural values that will be at stake. Yet there is (or ought to be) a kind of historical accountability, an effort to judge as good or bad the particular ways in which we, individually and collectively, have treated each other, and records and archives have their role to play in that process” (11).
He acknowledged that judgments about history morph over time, but he pointed to two examples of situations in which historical records helped to provide some long-term accountability for wrong actions:
- totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany, Armenia, the Soviet Union, Mao’s China, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, etc. — with the simple acknowledgment that “documentation may be used to manage tyranny while it is in power and to expose it afterwards” (12)
- violations of human rights in democratic societies — including slavery, interment camps, displacements and assimilations of native populations, eugenics, etc.
O’Toole did caution against looking to records for quick fixes:
“Historical accountability requires that we look at such examples not as mere exercises in breast-beating or self-flagellation, opportunities to feel good about ourselves by feeling bad, or chances to reassure ourselves that we are more moral and, well, just better than those who went before us. Rather, they highlight the importance of taking a long historical view and exploring the ways in which records of the offences may be used to expose them and to pass moral judgments on those who perpetrated them” (13).
But he did assert that historical accountability is part of the archival mission and, therefore, helps to define a moral theology of archives. He provided examples related to appraisal and acquisition, emphasizing that a broad moral theology can close some of the loopholes that may exist with simple codes of ethics. For example, acquisition decisions “in accordance with their institutions’ purposes stated policies, and resources” (as stated in the SAA Code) might result in the loss of documentation of child sexual abuse because a different use of the records could be “contrary to the interests of their creators” (14). Secondly, he challenged description archivists to take a step back and first gain a better understanding of the record-keeping systems in which institutional records were created so that changes in purpose, form, and usage of the records can be acknowledged in their description. Lastly, he contended that records that are retained by archives but inaccessible to researchers fall short of the measure of accountability.
O’Toole concluded with his “fundamental reason” for archival work: “a belief in the value of preserving part of society’s collective memory and helping to bring that memory to bear when and where it is needed” (19). He also listed several questions that deserve further attention:
- What defines a moral archivist, and how can archivists develop our moral sense?
- Can/should a moral theology be part of the archival curriculum?
- Where are the academics who can devote their intellectual prowess to defining a moral theology of archives?